ECB Launches Pontes: Tokenised Finance Moves Into Central-Bank Money
Europe is moving blockchain settlement beyond experimentation by enabling financial institutions to settle tokenised transactions using ECB-backed euros.
Executive Summary
The European Central Bank has launched Pontes, a new service connecting Europe’s established payment infrastructure with financial transactions recorded on distributed-ledger platforms.
Pontes enables participating banks and investors to settle tokenised securities transactions using central-bank money rather than privately issued stablecoins or commercial-bank tokens.
Initial participants reportedly include Deutsche Bank, Santander and Clearstream. The ECB has also indicated that it will invest a limited portion of its own funds in eligible euro-denominated tokenised securities issued by public institutions. ([reuters.com][1])
This is not the launch of a retail digital euro for households. It is an institutional settlement development with potentially significant implications for tokenised bonds, wholesale payments, market infrastructure and the future balance between public and private digital money.
Why This Matters
Tokenisation has often been presented as a technological breakthrough, but issuing a financial asset on a blockchain solves only part of the problem.
Institutions must still determine how that asset will be paid for, how ownership will be transferred, what form of money will complete the transaction and who will carry the settlement risk.
Pontes addresses one of these central questions by connecting tokenised assets to central-bank money.
This matters because central-bank money is generally considered the safest settlement asset within the financial system. It does not carry the same issuer or redemption risk associated with privately issued settlement instruments.
The ECB is therefore not merely experimenting with blockchain. It is attempting to ensure that the euro remains central to Europe’s financial infrastructure as securities markets become increasingly tokenised.
What Happened?
The ECB launched Pontes on 21 September 2026.
The service allows transactions recorded on privately operated distributed ledgers to be settled through Europe’s central-bank payment infrastructure.
Initial operations are limited to business days, reportedly between 8:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. Central European Time, with services expected to expand gradually. A first group of banks and financial-market infrastructure providers has completed onboarding. ([reuters.com][1])
The ECB also intends to acquire a limited amount of qualifying tokenised securities for its own investment portfolio. These are tokenised conventional financial instruments not cryptocurrencies.
That distinction is important. The ECB is testing how established securities can be issued, exchanged and settled through digital-ledger infrastructure while retaining the protections and monetary foundations of regulated finance.
The Bigger Picture
A contest is developing over the money that will settle tokenised transactions.
One model depends on privately issued stablecoins. Another uses commercial-bank deposit tokens. A third preserves central-bank money as the foundation of wholesale settlement.
Pontes represents the ECB’s answer.
The institution appears willing to adopt elements of distributed-ledger technology, but it does not want Europe’s future financial markets to become dependent on foreign-currency stablecoins or privately controlled payment networks.
This is therefore both a technological and monetary-sovereignty project.
Europe wants the efficiency promised by tokenisation without surrendering control of settlement money, financial stability or the international role of the euro.
Pontes also sits alongside rather than replaces the proposed retail digital euro. The retail initiative concerns payments by individuals and merchants, while Pontes is initially focused on transactions between regulated financial institutions.
Market Impact
The immediate market impact may be modest because Pontes begins with limited participants, operating hours and eligible transactions.
Its structural significance is much greater.
For banks, it could reduce the operational fragmentation created when tokenised assets trade on new platforms but still require conventional settlement processes.
For asset issuers, access to central-bank settlement may improve institutional confidence in tokenised bonds and other securities.
For market-infrastructure providers, it creates pressure to develop systems capable of connecting conventional finance with multiple distributed ledgers.
For stablecoin issuers, the development introduces a powerful institutional competitor. Stablecoins may remain valuable for global, retail and continuously operating markets, but central-bank settlement could become the preferred option for regulated euro-denominated securities.
Investors should not interpret Pontes as an endorsement of every blockchain asset. The more credible opportunity lies in infrastructure providers, regulated tokenisation platforms, digital custody, compliance technology and institutions capable of integrating traditional securities with programmable settlement.
Editorial Perspective
Pontes demonstrates that the institutional adoption of blockchain will probably look very different from the speculative narratives that have dominated the crypto market.
The future may not involve banks abandoning central-bank money for decentralised currencies. It may instead involve regulated institutions using blockchain-based infrastructure while continuing to settle in sovereign money.
That is a less dramatic transformation, but potentially a more durable one.
The ECB is effectively separating blockchain technology from cryptocurrency speculation. It is adopting the infrastructure while preserving regulated assets, institutional intermediaries and central-bank settlement.
However, the project should not be declared successful merely because it has launched.
Its real value will depend on transaction volume, interoperability, legal certainty, operating availability, cost reduction and whether institutions use it for genuine market activity rather than controlled demonstrations.
Tokenisation becomes economically meaningful only when it improves how assets are issued, traded, financed, used as collateral and settled.
What to Watch Next
Investors and financial institutions should monitor:
* The value and number of transactions settled through Pontes.
* Expansion beyond the initial group of participating institutions.
* Progress toward longer operating hours and eventual continuous settlement.
* The types of tokenised securities admitted to the platform.
* Whether Pontes connects successfully with multiple private ledgers.
* The ECB’s purchases of tokenised public-sector securities.
* Competition between central-bank money, deposit tokens and stablecoins.
* Similar wholesale-settlement initiatives from other major central banks.
* The development of the separate retail digital euro.
* Evidence that tokenisation reduces costs rather than simply adding another technological layer.
Key Takeaways
* The ECB has launched Pontes to connect tokenised financial markets with central-bank settlement.
* Participating institutions can settle eligible transactions using ECB-backed euros rather than relying exclusively on private digital currencies.
* Pontes is an institutional settlement service, not the retail digital euro.
* The ECB’s planned investment in tokenised securities represents a practical step beyond observation.
* The development strengthens the institutional case for tokenised bonds and regulated digital-market infrastructure.
* Stablecoins will continue to play an important role, but they will face competition from central-bank and commercial-bank settlement instruments.
* Pontes should be judged by adoption, interoperability, transaction volume and measurable efficiency not by launch day announcements.
About Akinyele Oluwale & Co. Investment Ltd.
Akinyele Oluwale & Co. Investment Ltd. is a digital-finance and market-intelligence firm providing independent analysis across global markets, institutional finance, blockchain technology, tokenisation, stablecoins, central banks and digital assets.
Our work explains not only what happened, but why it matters, what it means for investors and what decision-makers should watch next.
Global Finance Meets Tomorrow’s Technology.
Visit: akinyeleoluwale.finance
This publication is provided for educational and informational purposes and does not constitute financial or investment advice.
[1]: https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/ecb-opens-blockchain-link-financial-markets-2026-09-21/?utm_source=chatgpt.com "ECB opens blockchain link to financial markets"
AI’s $300 Billion Off-Balance-Sheet Buildout
The artificial-intelligence boom is no longer only a technology story it is becoming a major test of credit markets, corporate transparency and financial risk management.
Published: September 21, 2026
Category: AI / Institutional Finance
By: Akinyele Oluwale
Executive Summary
The global artificial-intelligence investment boom is entering a more complicated financial phase.
Major technology companies and their commercial partners are reportedly supporting as much as $300 billion of financing for data centres, advanced semiconductors and related AI infrastructure through special-purpose vehicles, long-term leases, purchase commitments and residual-value guarantees.
These financing arrangements allow separately structured entities to own and fund expensive infrastructure. The technology companies then obtain access to the assets through leases, commercial agreements or financial guarantees without necessarily reporting all the project debt as ordinary corporate borrowing.
This does not mean that $300 billion of losses has been concealed. It also does not automatically make the financing structures improper. Special-purpose vehicles are commonly used to finance property, aircraft, energy infrastructure and other capital-intensive projects.
However, investors must distinguish between the accounting location of an obligation and the party that ultimately bears its economic risk.
If demand for artificial intelligence continues expanding and the infrastructure generates sufficient revenue, these structures could represent an efficient way to finance productive assets.
If AI revenues disappoint, data-centre capacity exceeds commercial demand or computing equipment becomes obsolete more quickly than projected, some guarantees and long-term commitments could become financially significant.
The AI revolution must therefore be evaluated through two separate lenses: its technological potential and the financial risks being created to support it.
Why This Matters
Artificial intelligence requires enormous physical investment.
Advanced AI models depend on specialised processors, high-speed memory, networking equipment, cooling systems, electricity infrastructure and large data centres. These facilities can require billions of dollars before producing meaningful commercial revenue.
Even the world’s largest technology companies face limits on how much infrastructure they can finance directly without affecting their cash reserves, debt ratios and credit ratings.
Off-balance-sheet and project-financing structures offer an alternative. They enable outside investors to provide capital while technology companies preserve some financial flexibility.
The concern is that a company can transfer the legal ownership of infrastructure without fully removing its commercial exposure to that infrastructure.
A residual-value guarantee, for example, may require the guarantor to compensate investors if the asset is worth less than an agreed amount at a future date. A long-term lease may require payments even when the infrastructure is no longer as profitable or technologically competitive as expected.
The issue is therefore not simply whether an obligation appears as conventional debt on a company’s balance sheet. The more important question is whether the company may still suffer a future cash outflow if the underlying investment underperforms.
These arrangements also expand the number of financial institutions exposed to the AI boom. Bond funds, private-credit firms, banks, insurers and pension funds may all provide capital to AI infrastructure projects.
A technology-sector slowdown could consequently become a broader credit-market issue.
What Happened?
According to a Financial Times investigation, Big Tech companies and their commercial partners are increasingly using financial guarantees to support as much as $300 billion of debt financing connected to AI data centres and computing equipment.
The financing is often arranged through special-purpose vehicles. These are separate legal entities created to own particular assets, raise financing and isolate specific project risks.
One prominent example is Meta’s Hyperion data-centre project in Louisiana.
The project was structured through a joint venture with Blue Owl Capital. Meta retained a minority ownership interest, while the separately structured entity raised approximately $27 billion to support the project.
Meta’s lease commitments and other forms of support helped make the financing attractive to institutional investors. However, much of the project debt was not presented as ordinary Meta corporate borrowing.
Other arrangements across the industry reportedly involve chip suppliers, cloud-service providers, AI developers and infrastructure investors. Guarantees may cover minimum asset values or support financing for customers purchasing large quantities of computing equipment.
These structures make it possible to continue expanding AI infrastructure without every dollar of associated project debt appearing directly on the technology companies’ conventional balance sheets.
The reported $300 billion should be understood as financing exposure supported through these arrangements not as an established loss or proof of accounting misconduct.
The Bigger Picture
The development reflects the extraordinary amount of capital required to build the infrastructure behind artificial intelligence.
The AI market is often discussed in terms of models, software capabilities and future productivity. Beneath that digital narrative is a physical economy involving land, construction, power generation, cooling equipment, fibre networks and semiconductor supply chains.
Financing this infrastructure requires the AI industry to move beyond traditional corporate capital expenditure.
The result is a growing relationship between technology companies and private capital. Investment banks design the structures. Institutional investors purchase the debt. Asset managers provide equity capital. Technology companies provide the commercial demand and financial commitments supporting the projects.
The arrangement works when demand assumptions prove correct.
The risk emerges when several participants rely on the same optimistic expectations: continued AI adoption, high data-centre utilisation, strong pricing and valuable computing equipment.
AI hardware can become obsolete faster than traditional infrastructure. A building may operate for decades, but its processors may lose economic competitiveness within a much shorter period.
Therefore, an AI data centre combines long-duration financing with assets exposed to rapid technological change. That mismatch deserves close attention.
Market Impact
In the short term, these financing structures are likely to support continued investment across the AI supply chain.
Data-centre developers, semiconductor manufacturers, electricity providers and construction companies could benefit from sustained capital expenditure.
Technology companies also benefit because they can expand computing capacity without funding every project directly. This may protect cash reserves and reduce immediate pressure on headline corporate leverage.
Investment banks and private-credit firms gain new opportunities to structure and finance large projects. Institutional investors receive access to long-duration debt supported by commitments from financially strong technology companies.
However, markets may begin demanding more transparency.
Credit-rating agencies are not limited to the debt reported on a company’s balance sheet. They can adjust their leverage calculations to reflect guarantees, leases and other debt-like commitments.
If analysts conclude that the economic exposure is materially larger than the reported corporate debt, financing costs could rise and credit ratings could face pressure.
Equity investors may also reconsider company valuations if infrastructure commitments begin consuming more cash than anticipated.
The greatest risk would be a simultaneous decline in AI revenue expectations and the market value of data-centre assets. Such a development could affect technology shares, private-credit portfolios, corporate bonds and infrastructure investors.
Editorial Perspective
Artificial intelligence may become one of the most important general-purpose technologies of the modern economy. That does not mean every AI company, data centre or financing structure will produce an acceptable return.
Investors must separate technological importance from investment profitability.
The internet transformed the global economy, but many companies financed during the dot-com boom still failed. Railways changed commerce, yet railway investment produced repeated financial crises. A transformative technology can create lasting economic value while destroying capital in poorly structured or excessively valued projects.
Off-balance-sheet financing is not automatically evidence of deception. It can allocate risk efficiently and connect long-term capital with infrastructure development.
The problem arises when accounting presentation creates the impression that risk has disappeared.
Risk does not disappear because it has been transferred to a special-purpose vehicle. It moves among shareholders, lenders, guarantors, tenants and asset owners.
Investors must therefore look beyond headline debt figures and examine the complete network of guarantees, leases, purchase commitments and commercial dependencies.
The critical principle is straightforward:
Moving an obligation outside the accounting balance sheet does not necessarily move the economic risk outside the company.
What to Watch Next
Investors should monitor the guarantees and long-term contractual commitments disclosed by major technology companies.
Particular attention should be given to residual-value guarantees, minimum purchase agreements, long-term data-centre leases and commitments to support separately financed customers or infrastructure providers.
Data-centre utilisation will be another important indicator. Large facilities must generate sufficient usage and revenue to justify their construction and financing costs.
The depreciation and secondary-market value of advanced processors should also be monitored. Rapid technological improvement could cause existing hardware to lose economic value faster than financing models assume.
Credit-rating agencies’ treatment of these obligations will be critical. If agencies begin counting more guarantees and lease commitments as adjusted debt, the financing advantages of these structures could narrow.
Investors should also compare AI-related revenue growth with capital expenditure and contractual commitments. Spending can rise rapidly, but the long-term investment case depends on whether recurring cash flow grows alongside it.
Finally, disclosure standards should improve. Companies should explain not only whether an arrangement meets the accounting definition of a liability, but also the circumstances under which it could require future payment.
Key Takeaways
* Big Tech and its partners are reportedly supporting up to $300 billion of AI infrastructure financing through special-purpose vehicles, leases and guarantees.
* The reported amount represents financing exposure—not an established financial loss.
* Off-balance-sheet financing is not automatically improper, but investors must assess the underlying economic obligations.
* Separately financed infrastructure can still expose technology companies through guarantees, leases and purchase commitments.
* AI hardware may become obsolete faster than traditional infrastructure, increasing residual-value risk.
* The AI boom is connecting technology companies more deeply with bond markets, private credit, insurers and institutional investors.
* AI may transform the global economy while some individual infrastructure projects still produce poor financial returns.
* Investors should follow cash flow, data-centre utilisation, guarantees and credit exposure not only technological announcements.
About Akinyele Oluwale & Co. Investment Ltd.
Akinyele Oluwale & Co. Investment Ltd. is a digital finance and market-intelligence company providing institutional analysis across artificial intelligence, blockchain technology, digital assets, tokenisation, real-world assets, stablecoins, central banks and global markets.
Our editorial approach goes beyond reporting headlines. We examine what happened, why it matters, how markets and stakeholders may be affected, and what investors should watch next.
Our objective is to make complex financial and technological developments understandable without sacrificing analytical depth, professional discipline or intellectual independence.
Sources: [Financial Times](https://www.ft.com/content/7f11afae-c4e3-4054-a65b-873f3647f563) and [Reuters](https://www.reuters.com/technology/meta-forms-joint-venture-with-blue-owl-capital-louisiana-data-center-2025-10-21/).
This publication is provided for information and education. It does not constitute investment, accounting, legal or financial advice.
Akinyele Oluwale & Co. Investment Ltd.
Where Global Finance Meets Tomorrow’s Technology.
Saudi Arabia Exits mBridge: What It Means for the Future of Cross-Border Digital Money
Published: September 20, 2026
Category: Stablecoins & Payments / Central Banks
By: Akinyele Oluwale
Executive Summary
Saudi Arabia has withdrawn from mBridge, the blockchain-based cross-border settlement platform connecting participating central banks through central bank digital currencies.
The Saudi Central Bank joined mBridge as a full participant in 2024. According to its explanation, its involvement was limited and exploratory, and the withdrawal followed the completion of its planned proof-of-concept work. Therefore, the decision should not automatically be interpreted as a rejection of central bank digital currencies, blockchain technology or financial cooperation with China.
Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia’s exit carries strategic importance.
The Kingdom occupies a significant position in global energy markets, Gulf finance and the international monetary system. Its participation had strengthened the perception that mBridge could develop into a meaningful alternative settlement channel for trade between Asia and the Middle East.
Its withdrawal raises questions about the governance, geopolitical acceptability and international scalability of cross-border central bank digital currency infrastructure.
The central issue is no longer whether blockchain technology can make international payments faster. The technology has already demonstrated that possibility. The harder questions are who controls the infrastructure, which currencies dominate it, how participating countries manage sanctions exposure, and whether rival geopolitical blocs will accept the same digital settlement rails.
Saudi Arabia’s decision illustrates that the future of digital money will be determined by diplomacy and monetary power as much as by technological efficiency.
Background
Project mBridge began as a collaborative experiment involving the Bank for International Settlements Innovation Hub, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, the Bank of Thailand, the Central Bank of the United Arab Emirates and the Digital Currency Institute of the People’s Bank of China.
The project was designed to address persistent weaknesses in international payments. Traditional cross-border transfers frequently involve several correspondent banks, repeated compliance checks, currency conversions, different operating hours and delayed settlement.
These layers can make transactions slow, expensive and difficult to track.
mBridge proposed a different model: participating central and commercial banks would conduct cross-border payments and foreign-exchange transactions directly through a shared distributed-ledger platform. Digital representations of sovereign currencies could be transferred and settled almost immediately.
A 2022 pilot involving 20 commercial banks processed more than 160 payment and foreign-exchange transactions with a combined value exceeding $22 million. The platform subsequently reached its minimum viable product stage in 2024.
Saudi Arabia joined as a full participant that year, while more than 26 central banks and institutions participated as observers. Its inclusion appeared to deepen the platform’s connection with the Gulf and potentially with international energy trade.
The Bank for International Settlements later stepped away from its direct operational involvement. Governance of the project moved towards the participating central banks, increasing the perception that China would exercise considerable influence over its future development.
Saudi Arabia has now ended its formal participation after completing what it described as its intended proof-of-concept programme.
Why it matters
Saudi Arabia’s departure matters because cross-border payment infrastructure is not politically neutral.
A payment system determines how transactions are routed, which institutions can participate, what information becomes visible, whose regulations apply and whether payments can be delayed, rejected or sanctioned.
The current international system remains heavily connected to the US dollar, correspondent banking relationships and messaging infrastructure such as SWIFT. This gives the United States and its allies substantial influence over the movement of global capital.
mBridge offers a model in which participating central banks can settle transactions directly using sovereign digital currencies. In theory, this could reduce costs and accelerate settlement. It could also reduce dependence on dollar-based intermediaries.
That second possibility makes the project geopolitically sensitive.
Saudi Arabia maintains important economic and energy relationships with China, while its currency remains pegged to the US dollar and its financial and security relationships with the United States remain significant. Participation in a payment network perceived as an alternative to the dollar system therefore requires careful diplomatic balancing.
The Saudi withdrawal does not prove that external political pressure caused the decision. The Saudi Central Bank described its participation as a limited experiment that concluded according to plan. However, the broader geopolitical environment cannot be ignored when assessing the strategic implications.
The decision also demonstrates that successful technology does not automatically produce international adoption. Cross-border digital currency systems require trust in governance, legal certainty, common compliance standards, cybersecurity coordination and agreement about how power is distributed among participating countries.
Stakeholders: Winners and Losers
The traditional dollar-centred financial system is a potential beneficiary. Saudi Arabia’s withdrawal removes, at least formally, an influential Gulf participant from a platform often discussed as an alternative to conventional correspondent banking.
Existing international banks may also benefit in the short term. Their role as intermediaries remains secure when governments hesitate to transfer settlement activity to shared central-bank digital currency networks.
Competing payment projects could gain an opportunity. Saudi Arabia may continue exploring other models, including bilateral digital-currency arrangements, tokenised deposits, regulated stablecoins or improvements to conventional instant-payment systems.
China and the remaining mBridge participants face a reputational setback, but not necessarily a technological failure. The platform continues to include important financial centres and central banks. Macau’s participation and continuing activity among existing members demonstrate that the project remains operational.
The most significant losers may be businesses and individuals that continue to bear the cost of inefficient cross-border payments. A fragmented international system means companies may still face high transfer fees, delayed settlement and limited transparency.
Emerging economies could also lose if geopolitical competition prevents the development of interoperable payment infrastructure. Many developing countries would benefit from cheaper remittances and reduced dependence on lengthy correspondent-banking chains.
Short-Term Impact
In the short term, Saudi Arabia’s exit is unlikely to stop mBridge or produce an immediate disruption to international payments.
The project can continue with its remaining participants, including China, Hong Kong, Thailand and the United Arab Emirates. Other central banks may continue observing or testing the technology without committing to full membership.
However, the withdrawal may make prospective members more cautious. Central banks considering participation will examine the reasons for Saudi Arabia’s departure, the platform’s governance structure and the geopolitical consequences of joining.
The decision could also encourage mBridge’s existing members to communicate more clearly about its governance. If the platform wants broad international acceptance, it must demonstrate that no single participant can dominate its technology, transaction rules or data.
Markets should avoid exaggerated conclusions. This is not evidence that CBDCs have failed, nor does it mean that Saudi Arabia has abandoned financial innovation. It is a reminder that pilot participation does not guarantee permanent adoption.
Long-Term Impact
The long-term risk is the fragmentation of the digital monetary system.
Instead of one interoperable global infrastructure, the world could develop competing payment networks aligned with different economic and political blocs. One network could be centred on the dollar, another on the renminbi, while regional arrangements emerge across the Gulf, Europe, Africa and Latin America.
Such competition may encourage innovation, but it could also create new inefficiencies. Banks and corporations may need to maintain access to several networks, comply with different technical standards and manage conflicting regulatory requirements.
There is also a question about the future role of stablecoins.
If governments cannot agree on shared CBDC infrastructure, regulated private stablecoins and tokenised commercial-bank deposits may become more important in cross-border settlement. These instruments may be easier to scale commercially, although they introduce their own questions concerning reserves, redemption, supervision and monetary sovereignty.
For Africa, the development deserves attention. African economies face some of the world’s highest remittance and cross-border payment costs. A credible multi-currency settlement platform could improve intra-African trade and reduce transaction delays.
However, African central banks must avoid becoming passive users of infrastructure governed elsewhere. Participation should be based on transparent governance, data protection, currency sovereignty and interoperability with domestic payment systems.
The lesson from Saudi Arabia is that countries should experiment—but they must understand the strategic consequences before committing national financial infrastructure to an international network.
Editorial Perspective
Saudi Arabia’s exit should be interpreted carefully.
The available evidence supports the Saudi Central Bank’s position that the exercise was exploratory and concluded after its proof-of-concept objectives were achieved. It would be irresponsible to present the decision as definitive evidence of a diplomatic break with China or direct intervention by the United States.
Yet it would be equally mistaken to treat the departure as an ordinary technical adjustment.
Money is an instrument of economic power. The infrastructure through which money moves is also an instrument of power.
The country or coalition that establishes the dominant standards for digital settlement could influence international trade, financial data, sanctions enforcement and currency usage for decades.
mBridge demonstrated that direct, real-time settlement between central banks is technologically possible. Its next challenge is political legitimacy. A platform cannot become genuinely international if prospective members believe its governance is concentrated or its participation may damage other strategic relationships.
The future of cross-border digital finance will therefore require more than faster blockchain networks. It will require governance structures that countries consider fair, neutral and resilient.
Saudi Arabia’s decision is not the end of mBridge. It is a warning that the global transition to digital money will not follow a purely technological path.
What to Watch Next
The first issue to monitor is whether the Saudi Central Bank announces another cross-border digital-currency, tokenisation or payment-modernisation initiative.
A move towards a bilateral arrangement, Gulf-led platform or regulated private-sector settlement system would show that Saudi Arabia’s withdrawal relates to platform design rather than opposition to digital money itself.
The second issue is mBridge governance. Existing participants may introduce clearer decision-making rules, expanded membership arrangements or safeguards designed to reassure prospective central banks.
Third, investors and policymakers should watch the involvement of the United Arab Emirates. The UAE remains both an important mBridge participant and a major financial centre with relationships across Western and Asian markets.
Fourth, the role of the digital yuan deserves attention. If the renminbi continues to dominate settlement activity on the platform, concerns that mBridge primarily advances China’s international monetary strategy may intensify.
Fifth, monitor the response of the United States, international financial institutions and global commercial banks. Efforts to modernise conventional cross-border payments may accelerate if alternative digital settlement platforms continue expanding.
Finally, African policymakers should monitor these developments from the perspective of infrastructure ownership, remittance costs and monetary sovereignty. The continent should participate in international digital-payment innovation, but it must also help shape the standards under which that infrastructure operates.
Notes
Saudi Arabia’s withdrawal from mBridge was reported by the [Financial Times](https://www.ft.com/content/ac104987-f43d-4e7d-97b6-057d98f7e422). The Saudi Central Bank reportedly stated that its participation was limited, exploratory and completed according to its original proof-of-concept plan.
The [Bank for International Settlements](https://www.bis.org/media-releases/20240605-project-mbridge-reaches-minimum-viable-product-stage-and-invites-further-international) confirmed Saudi Arabia’s admission as a full participant in 2024 and described mBridge as a distributed-ledger platform designed to facilitate immediate cross-border payments and settlement.
The BIS’s [2022 project report](https://www.bis.org/publications/project-mbridge-connecting-economies-through-cbdc) documented more than 160 real-value transactions involving 20 commercial banks, with combined payment and foreign-exchange transaction value exceeding $22 million.
This publication is for information and education. It does not constitute financial, legal or investment advice.
Akinyele Oluwale & Co. Investment Ltd.
Where Global Finance Meets Tomorrow’s Technology.
